I'd be very interested to know if this would replicate with more complex deontological judgements. My intuition would be no.
Take a view like Rossian-style pluralism, where we have pro-tanto duties which we have to weigh and judge between to determine what we ought to do all-things-considered. I'd be very surprised if this kind of ethical process did not light up the calculating parts of the brain.
I also wonder whether the questions in the experiment were somewhat rigged in favour of the consequentialism coming out as the slow deliberative option. The sort where deontological reasoning gives you a quick answer and consequentialism gives you a long answer: 'should we kill one person to give 5 people their organs'. When we could also ask questions which are deontologically complex but easy for the consequentialist: 'should we lie to someone to make them happy (assuming no chance of being caught nor any further negative effects)'. I imagine that in the second case the consequentialist will have a more snap judgement and the (non-Kantian/more reasonable) deontologist might have to think about the case a lot more to come to a judgement
That is a great intuition you had. Other researchers had it too and critiqued Greene on these grounds in this paper: The neural basis of intuitive and counterintuitive moral judgments.
“Naturally, being a philosopher, he wasn’t content to simply declare masturbation immoral, he had to justify it.”
Most philosophers do attempt to “justify” their views. In other words, they attempt to offer epistemological support for them. But—as critical rationalism explains—all arguments and evidence can only ultimately rest on assumptions; and assumptions, ipso facto, cannot provide epistemological support. So, when philosophers use consequentialism, deontologism, social contractism, etc., they can only really be providing conjectural explanations of how some moral issue can be perceived (but, as such, these are valid and useful approaches). Such conjectural explanations can sometimes be sufficiently plausible that a reader can find himself experiencing a switch to accepting the explanation. In other words, that explanation is experienced as refuting any criticisms (which include alternative theories) that he previously accepted. We can refute but not support.
It will often be immediately objected that by the same arguments neither is a refutation possible. But that is to fail to grasp the logical asymmetry between the two. Logically, no amount of merely compatible arguments or evidence can support a universal theory such as “all masturbation is immoral” (strictly, even so-called “singular observations” have universal implications—many of which are counterfactual—so they are not supportable either). But, also logically, one sound argument or any correctly perceived incompatible evidence could refute that theory. Epistemologically, support is logically impossible while refutation is logically possible.
The next objection is often to concede the logical possibility but point out that any putative refutation will itself be based on assumptions, and so no refutation can be supported either. Quite right: refutations are not supported. However, the conjecture that a refutation of a theory is sound (that it has true premises and valid deductions of falsity) is logically coherent. But the conjecture that a support of a theory is sound is not logically coherent (we cannot validly deduce the truth, or even “support”, of a theory from merely compatible arguments and evidence). Logically possible refutation is all we have to go on: we cannot leave the realm of conjecture (but we often seem to be able to achieve progress with that). This is all a step too far for most philosophers; their common sense gets the better of their reasoning.
On masturbation in particular. As this is compatible with liberty, then any libertarian will conjecture that it is morally acceptable (or thereby cease to be completely libertarian). Masturbation can also be explained as being compatible with consequentialism, deontologism, social contractism, etc., but such compatibility cannot offer support. Rather, these explanations—at least if they are accepted—will be perceived as refuting various explanations that masturbation is not compatible in these various ways (or as refuting any known other theories). The thesis of the moral acceptability of masturbation is only an unrefuted conjecture. Some, as yet unknown, argument might eventually refute it; but don’t hold your breath (especially while masturbating).
Nietzsche's critique of Kant is that he is defending common-place ideas with scholarly flair. Plato advocates wife sharing and the Noble Lie. Unlike Kant, who makes his intention clear, Plato's dialogues leave room for an incredible amount of nuance and ambiguity as to which character in the dialogue (if any) that Plato actually agrees with. Putting Kant and Plato in the same basket as "stuffy old guys who just added flair to the conventional wisdom of their day" isn't a fair characterization.
Huemer says they are "bad ad thinking", Nietzsche says that Kant is defending common-place ideas with scholarly flair. They both seem to reinforce Greene's analysis from different directions.
Are you saying you disagree with Huemer's characterization of them as 'bad at thinking'?
But then what you call “deontological instincts” are really consequentialist instincts. And deontology becomes an attempt to subsume those consequentialist instincts under a (clunky and inefficient) principle.
A common critique of consequentialist moral theories is that it seems like they would require individuals to constantly calculate all possible outcomes of their actions.
Quick rules on how to act provided by deontological intuitions would be a ruff but efficient way out of this impasse.
Yes but why the “deontological” qualifier? And why “rules?” Moral intuition solves the problem of moral calculation, period. There aren’t deontological and consequentialist moral intuitions. There are just moral intuitions. And it just so happens that, by and large, following your moral intuitions tends to make things go best.
> Regions of the brain linked to higher-order cognition—like abstract reasoning and deliberation—light up during consequentialist thinking, while “emotional centers” are more active when people consider duties, values, and moral norms. Yes, we have been putting people in fMRI machines and asking them if they would push a man off a bridge to stop a runaway trolley
So, I clicked on the paper to look at those fMRI scans but they weren't included. After searching for a while I discovered where they came from (An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment) and it doesn't really tell us anything about deontology vs consequentialism. Those terms aren't even mentioned, nor are "duties", "values", and "moral norms". I guess those are from another study?
Yes, I know what my answer should be (bla bla, he's committing the naturalistic fallacy, bla bla), but honestly, I just want to see his study design.
The last section also went a bit fast for me. Why should we assume that deontologists like Kant used system 1 in their writing? I've read Kant's work on aesthetics and it reads like a computer is explaining aesthetics to me in a thinly disguised programming language, hardly system 1.
Also, I need to a bit more on why deontology would be a quick and dirty proxy for consequentialism, because now it seems like you're begging the question. Also is this an argument about average deontological vs consequentialist theories? Because there are very complex deontological theories and very simple consequentialist theories.
1) Greene cites the study you found (that he himself conducted) as evidence towards the fact that deontological type judgments, which he considered linked to duties, rights and rules, are connected to the "emotional centers".
2) From what I understand Greene thinks he is doing system 2 thinking but only to rationalize a system 1 intuition.
3) I guess the argument would be this.
In many domains of knowledge we see a predictable difference between intuitions and deliberation after thinking.
The intuitions seem to be quick heuristics to approximate the results obtained after deep thinking at a fraction of the cognitive cost.
It's reasonable to think this pattern will apply to morality.
We apparently have evidence for it.
Greene also has evidence for the deep thinking leading to more consequentialist answers while intuitions seems more based on rules and duties.
Thus we make the inference that deontological intuitions are meant to approximate consequentialism.
4) Greene discusses this at a certain point and explains that the type of deontology he is considering is the non complex cases. I started explaining it and then cut this stuff from the blogpost to streamline it.
Thanks for the quick reply. As for 1) I don't really see how it counts as evidence. For 2) I don't understand how we would know deontological system 2 thinking is rationalization while consequentialist system 2 thinking isn't rationalization. For 3) Assuming that morality indeed works the same, it's logical to assume moral *intuitions* might be proxy's for moral *reasoning*, but why should we expect deontological *reasoning* to be a proxy for *consequentialist* reasoning? Think of something like contractarianism. The amount of complexity/computational-resources this takes is arguably greater than standard utilitarianism (or at least, there are many scenarios where this is the case). Which leads me to 4) even if we accept these premises, couldn't we also expect that the true moral theory is just a complex deontological theory?
For 1) I thought the fact was that when people had more deontological type intuitions the "emotional centers" of the brain show more signs of functioning than the reasoning parts and the opposite is true for consequentialism.
2) Humm good question. There is an interesting paper that critiques Greene along this same line of thought. It's entitled "The neural basis of intuitive and counterintuitive moral judgments" .
3) I think it depends on the definition one wants to give of deontology in the setting we are discussing. But the idea that we have intuitive rules to achieve good moral outcomes to save cognitive resources seems to map nicely on the deontology/consequentialism dichotomy. Perhaps there is a better theory.
For 1) So this study is about "personal" vs "impersonal". It seems fine to categorize consequentialists theories as mostly "impersonal", although I should note that the most personal theory of all, ethical egoism, is a consequentialist theory. However, It doesn't seem fine to categorize deontological theories as mostly "personal". According to (the most common interpretation of) Kantianism, you can't lie to an axe murderer to safe your mother's life. Seems kinda impersonal to me. This argument might actually work better against *virtue ethics* than deontology.
2) Oh nice
3) Maybe this works better for... let's disparagingly call them "listicle theories", e.g. divine command theory. If we have a finite set of concrete actions, then it might be less computationally demanding than e.g. utilitarianism. Though 1) there are many "non-listicle" deontological theories that do not work on a finite set of concrete actions (e.g., with contractarianism you need to keep calculating and re-calculating what you owe to everybody and how your web of weighted obligations shifts after each scenario) and 2) these "listicles" can become pretty dang complex if we're literalists and/or follow an entire holy book instead of e.g., just 10 commandments ( see also: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Year_of_Living_Biblically )
1) I think these are good questions. Regarding all the evidence Greene cites to support his theory the best paper to look at is this one "Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive Neuroscience Matters for Ethics" he lists directly a body of work that seem to lead to his conclusion.
3) I agree that deontology is used in a narrow sense by Greene and that it can be a bit confusing. Perhaps it would be better to just say "rule or value based intuitions"?
I think that we're often underestimating the value and importance of our intuition, emotions and System 1 thinking in general. They deal with vastly greater amount of information than our conscious mind can deal with. They actually process countless inputs that we aren't even aware of, and produce an output in form of certain intuition or emotion. They aren't simple shortcuts, they are actually very complex and precise calculations, only done on unconscious level. Let's take a professional tennis player as an example. She knows exactly how and when to hit a ball, so that it lands precisely where she intended. This is impossible to achieve without complex physical modeling and calculations. And her brain does all that modelling - only on unconscious level. And she successfully hits the ball properly, to achieve certain result. If she had to manually and consciously do all that calculation it would take her perhaps 15 minutes, and she would need to use calculators, formulas, and quite complex physics. The result her unconscious mind gave her is very close to the optimal result that she could achieve with making explicit physical simulation. It's not just a shortcut, our unconscious mind actually does that simulation, with adequate precision.
Perhaps a similar process is involved in moral judgements as well.
Maybe worth noting that being a committed deontologist -- besides saving you time -- will also have some strategic benefits. If you're willing to engage in costly punishment (for example), and the word gets out, then you're probably not going to get as many people coming for you. Similar benefits to honesty, fidelity, etc.
Most philosophers who know this probably got it from Reasons & Persons. But there's a nice book by Robert Frank, for the econ-curious:
Duty ethics uses rigid (System 1, LH-dominated) thinking. Leor Zmigrod uses "rigid" when describing ideological thinking (see her new book: "The Ideological Brain"). It's the thinking that confuses and conflates morality with ideology, with either/or notions about absolute authorities, imperatives, loyalty, purity, & the sacred. Both System 1 and 2 start with intuited belief. Only System 2 will doubt, question, analyze and reflect whether the evidence suggests the intuition be maintained, revised, or replaced. System 1 will justify the belief, no matter the evidence, and so will not be a shortcut to System 2.
Please show how this is flawed. Please question my thinking. The way ethical theories are characterized by thinking style has long been a personal research area for me.
I guess when people say a "shortcut to System 2," it doesn't mean it actually leads to a System 2 judgment. Rather, the idea is that the System 1 intuition—without us realizing it—is approximating the same goal or outcome that a System 2 process would aim for.
It's an approximation to a full System 2 deliberation "A shortcut to" was unclear wording on my part.
I find the methods used by metaphysical-ideological thinkers to be in opposition to the methods that characterize scientific avoiders of dogma (freethinkers).
Metaphysical-ideological Truths are universal, necessary, and certain (absolutes, no approximations). This thinking makes morality into a list of duties. It relies on justifications made using deductions from "self-evident" or other unquestionable assumptions (& from authority).
Scientific truths are warranted assertions. They are particular, contingent, situated, and probable approximations. Along with hypothetico deductive reasoning, scientific thinkers will use abductive reasoning. They take responsibility for their moral decisions by continuously questioning and reasoning to better inferences. They understand that knowing is a process that has no aim or end.
I'm being summary here only because a better explication would require a conversation where definitions are agreed upon and contrary opinions focused upon. Know that I wish to improve my understandings.
In case anyone wants further discussion I should say that I don't have good opinions of Jonathan Haidt or Joshua Greene. I do have good opinions of George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, John Tooby, Leor Zmigrod, and of Iain McGilchrist (subtracting his metaphysical notions). I like Erik Asp's false tagging theory of belief formation. I also like John Dewey's and Hugh Lafollette's pragmatic ethics.
I would be interested in one day reading an article where you lay down your thoughts in full, with all relevant definitions. Seems interesting and there could be much I could learn.
Thanks for asking! I've put many of my thoughts about morality and styles of thinking into answers on my Quora page (Alan Grinnell Jones). I use the site to set down my notions of what's what. It's nice to be able to go thru and revise them. I have only 119 "answers" that you might skim to read my thinking on topics of interest. I'd be very happy to improve my notions with your help.
Regarding ethics, the excerpt from Hugh Lafollette is what I'd give as my current stance. Again, I'd be very happy to have your comments and suggestions. https://qr.ae/pGBxQO
Greene’s deeper problem is one that’s all too common. He thinks he’s discovered a problem with morality (or normativity) in particular. But he’s really discovered a general problem with reason. “We have a strong emotional reaction, and then we invent a principle to match it,” you write. But you could just as easily say: we have strong perceptual reactions, and then we invent theories to match them. His view depends on a clear distinction between intuition and perception, which is exactly what Kant denies.
Kant’s ideas about masturbation are pretty normal going back through Christian tradition to Platonic philosophy.
The idea is, if we simply allow our base desires to decide our actions, they will lead us into overindulgence, sloth, and immoral behavior. Only by mastering our desires, and not letting them master us, can we possibly act morally, so even in circumstances where it would be more pleasurable to allow our “animal instincts” to guide our decisions, without any apparent moral cost, we should still subordinate those desires to our rational instinct. Habits in one area of life are likely to reflect in other areas, so a man who pleasures himself for no other reason than its pleasurable will be in a very weak position to choose the moral, rather than pleasurable act later on.
My reading of Kant is that he is well aware of incompleteness of deontological system. In short, if the system is logicaly incomplete, but seems to be working, as the humanity is improving and progressing, this is God's design for all intents and purposes. Of course if you take God out of the picture the system gets shaky. If you squint a bit, this debate is just idealism vs materialism.
I'd be very interested to know if this would replicate with more complex deontological judgements. My intuition would be no.
Take a view like Rossian-style pluralism, where we have pro-tanto duties which we have to weigh and judge between to determine what we ought to do all-things-considered. I'd be very surprised if this kind of ethical process did not light up the calculating parts of the brain.
I also wonder whether the questions in the experiment were somewhat rigged in favour of the consequentialism coming out as the slow deliberative option. The sort where deontological reasoning gives you a quick answer and consequentialism gives you a long answer: 'should we kill one person to give 5 people their organs'. When we could also ask questions which are deontologically complex but easy for the consequentialist: 'should we lie to someone to make them happy (assuming no chance of being caught nor any further negative effects)'. I imagine that in the second case the consequentialist will have a more snap judgement and the (non-Kantian/more reasonable) deontologist might have to think about the case a lot more to come to a judgement
That is a great intuition you had. Other researchers had it too and critiqued Greene on these grounds in this paper: The neural basis of intuitive and counterintuitive moral judgments.
Nice. Thanks for the further reading!
“Naturally, being a philosopher, he wasn’t content to simply declare masturbation immoral, he had to justify it.”
Most philosophers do attempt to “justify” their views. In other words, they attempt to offer epistemological support for them. But—as critical rationalism explains—all arguments and evidence can only ultimately rest on assumptions; and assumptions, ipso facto, cannot provide epistemological support. So, when philosophers use consequentialism, deontologism, social contractism, etc., they can only really be providing conjectural explanations of how some moral issue can be perceived (but, as such, these are valid and useful approaches). Such conjectural explanations can sometimes be sufficiently plausible that a reader can find himself experiencing a switch to accepting the explanation. In other words, that explanation is experienced as refuting any criticisms (which include alternative theories) that he previously accepted. We can refute but not support.
It will often be immediately objected that by the same arguments neither is a refutation possible. But that is to fail to grasp the logical asymmetry between the two. Logically, no amount of merely compatible arguments or evidence can support a universal theory such as “all masturbation is immoral” (strictly, even so-called “singular observations” have universal implications—many of which are counterfactual—so they are not supportable either). But, also logically, one sound argument or any correctly perceived incompatible evidence could refute that theory. Epistemologically, support is logically impossible while refutation is logically possible.
The next objection is often to concede the logical possibility but point out that any putative refutation will itself be based on assumptions, and so no refutation can be supported either. Quite right: refutations are not supported. However, the conjecture that a refutation of a theory is sound (that it has true premises and valid deductions of falsity) is logically coherent. But the conjecture that a support of a theory is sound is not logically coherent (we cannot validly deduce the truth, or even “support”, of a theory from merely compatible arguments and evidence). Logically possible refutation is all we have to go on: we cannot leave the realm of conjecture (but we often seem to be able to achieve progress with that). This is all a step too far for most philosophers; their common sense gets the better of their reasoning.
On masturbation in particular. As this is compatible with liberty, then any libertarian will conjecture that it is morally acceptable (or thereby cease to be completely libertarian). Masturbation can also be explained as being compatible with consequentialism, deontologism, social contractism, etc., but such compatibility cannot offer support. Rather, these explanations—at least if they are accepted—will be perceived as refuting various explanations that masturbation is not compatible in these various ways (or as refuting any known other theories). The thesis of the moral acceptability of masturbation is only an unrefuted conjecture. Some, as yet unknown, argument might eventually refute it; but don’t hold your breath (especially while masturbating).
https://jclester.substack.com/p/critical-rationalism
https://jclester.substack.com/p/consequentialism-deontologism-and
https://jclester.substack.com/p/common-sense-and-libertarianism
Nietzsche's critique of Kant is that he is defending common-place ideas with scholarly flair. Plato advocates wife sharing and the Noble Lie. Unlike Kant, who makes his intention clear, Plato's dialogues leave room for an incredible amount of nuance and ambiguity as to which character in the dialogue (if any) that Plato actually agrees with. Putting Kant and Plato in the same basket as "stuffy old guys who just added flair to the conventional wisdom of their day" isn't a fair characterization.
Huemer says they are "bad ad thinking", Nietzsche says that Kant is defending common-place ideas with scholarly flair. They both seem to reinforce Greene's analysis from different directions.
Are you saying you disagree with Huemer's characterization of them as 'bad at thinking'?
I think Plato is awesome at thinking :)
But then what you call “deontological instincts” are really consequentialist instincts. And deontology becomes an attempt to subsume those consequentialist instincts under a (clunky and inefficient) principle.
A common critique of consequentialist moral theories is that it seems like they would require individuals to constantly calculate all possible outcomes of their actions.
Quick rules on how to act provided by deontological intuitions would be a ruff but efficient way out of this impasse.
Yes but why the “deontological” qualifier? And why “rules?” Moral intuition solves the problem of moral calculation, period. There aren’t deontological and consequentialist moral intuitions. There are just moral intuitions. And it just so happens that, by and large, following your moral intuitions tends to make things go best.
> Regions of the brain linked to higher-order cognition—like abstract reasoning and deliberation—light up during consequentialist thinking, while “emotional centers” are more active when people consider duties, values, and moral norms. Yes, we have been putting people in fMRI machines and asking them if they would push a man off a bridge to stop a runaway trolley
So, I clicked on the paper to look at those fMRI scans but they weren't included. After searching for a while I discovered where they came from (An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment) and it doesn't really tell us anything about deontology vs consequentialism. Those terms aren't even mentioned, nor are "duties", "values", and "moral norms". I guess those are from another study?
Yes, I know what my answer should be (bla bla, he's committing the naturalistic fallacy, bla bla), but honestly, I just want to see his study design.
The last section also went a bit fast for me. Why should we assume that deontologists like Kant used system 1 in their writing? I've read Kant's work on aesthetics and it reads like a computer is explaining aesthetics to me in a thinly disguised programming language, hardly system 1.
Also, I need to a bit more on why deontology would be a quick and dirty proxy for consequentialism, because now it seems like you're begging the question. Also is this an argument about average deontological vs consequentialist theories? Because there are very complex deontological theories and very simple consequentialist theories.
1) Greene cites the study you found (that he himself conducted) as evidence towards the fact that deontological type judgments, which he considered linked to duties, rights and rules, are connected to the "emotional centers".
2) From what I understand Greene thinks he is doing system 2 thinking but only to rationalize a system 1 intuition.
3) I guess the argument would be this.
In many domains of knowledge we see a predictable difference between intuitions and deliberation after thinking.
The intuitions seem to be quick heuristics to approximate the results obtained after deep thinking at a fraction of the cognitive cost.
It's reasonable to think this pattern will apply to morality.
We apparently have evidence for it.
Greene also has evidence for the deep thinking leading to more consequentialist answers while intuitions seems more based on rules and duties.
Thus we make the inference that deontological intuitions are meant to approximate consequentialism.
4) Greene discusses this at a certain point and explains that the type of deontology he is considering is the non complex cases. I started explaining it and then cut this stuff from the blogpost to streamline it.
Thanks for the quick reply. As for 1) I don't really see how it counts as evidence. For 2) I don't understand how we would know deontological system 2 thinking is rationalization while consequentialist system 2 thinking isn't rationalization. For 3) Assuming that morality indeed works the same, it's logical to assume moral *intuitions* might be proxy's for moral *reasoning*, but why should we expect deontological *reasoning* to be a proxy for *consequentialist* reasoning? Think of something like contractarianism. The amount of complexity/computational-resources this takes is arguably greater than standard utilitarianism (or at least, there are many scenarios where this is the case). Which leads me to 4) even if we accept these premises, couldn't we also expect that the true moral theory is just a complex deontological theory?
Thank you for the comment my man!
For 1) I thought the fact was that when people had more deontological type intuitions the "emotional centers" of the brain show more signs of functioning than the reasoning parts and the opposite is true for consequentialism.
2) Humm good question. There is an interesting paper that critiques Greene along this same line of thought. It's entitled "The neural basis of intuitive and counterintuitive moral judgments" .
3) I think it depends on the definition one wants to give of deontology in the setting we are discussing. But the idea that we have intuitive rules to achieve good moral outcomes to save cognitive resources seems to map nicely on the deontology/consequentialism dichotomy. Perhaps there is a better theory.
No problemo, my fellow humanoid
For 1) So this study is about "personal" vs "impersonal". It seems fine to categorize consequentialists theories as mostly "impersonal", although I should note that the most personal theory of all, ethical egoism, is a consequentialist theory. However, It doesn't seem fine to categorize deontological theories as mostly "personal". According to (the most common interpretation of) Kantianism, you can't lie to an axe murderer to safe your mother's life. Seems kinda impersonal to me. This argument might actually work better against *virtue ethics* than deontology.
2) Oh nice
3) Maybe this works better for... let's disparagingly call them "listicle theories", e.g. divine command theory. If we have a finite set of concrete actions, then it might be less computationally demanding than e.g. utilitarianism. Though 1) there are many "non-listicle" deontological theories that do not work on a finite set of concrete actions (e.g., with contractarianism you need to keep calculating and re-calculating what you owe to everybody and how your web of weighted obligations shifts after each scenario) and 2) these "listicles" can become pretty dang complex if we're literalists and/or follow an entire holy book instead of e.g., just 10 commandments ( see also: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Year_of_Living_Biblically )
1) I think these are good questions. Regarding all the evidence Greene cites to support his theory the best paper to look at is this one "Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive Neuroscience Matters for Ethics" he lists directly a body of work that seem to lead to his conclusion.
3) I agree that deontology is used in a narrow sense by Greene and that it can be a bit confusing. Perhaps it would be better to just say "rule or value based intuitions"?
I think that we're often underestimating the value and importance of our intuition, emotions and System 1 thinking in general. They deal with vastly greater amount of information than our conscious mind can deal with. They actually process countless inputs that we aren't even aware of, and produce an output in form of certain intuition or emotion. They aren't simple shortcuts, they are actually very complex and precise calculations, only done on unconscious level. Let's take a professional tennis player as an example. She knows exactly how and when to hit a ball, so that it lands precisely where she intended. This is impossible to achieve without complex physical modeling and calculations. And her brain does all that modelling - only on unconscious level. And she successfully hits the ball properly, to achieve certain result. If she had to manually and consciously do all that calculation it would take her perhaps 15 minutes, and she would need to use calculators, formulas, and quite complex physics. The result her unconscious mind gave her is very close to the optimal result that she could achieve with making explicit physical simulation. It's not just a shortcut, our unconscious mind actually does that simulation, with adequate precision.
Perhaps a similar process is involved in moral judgements as well.
This all seems premised on the idea that “aversion to masturbation” is a common reflexive emotional feeling and I’m not sure I agree
Great post, insanely clickable title.
Maybe worth noting that being a committed deontologist -- besides saving you time -- will also have some strategic benefits. If you're willing to engage in costly punishment (for example), and the word gets out, then you're probably not going to get as many people coming for you. Similar benefits to honesty, fidelity, etc.
Most philosophers who know this probably got it from Reasons & Persons. But there's a nice book by Robert Frank, for the econ-curious:
https://www.amazon.com/Passions-Within-Reason-Strategic-Emotions/dp/0393960226
Duty ethics uses rigid (System 1, LH-dominated) thinking. Leor Zmigrod uses "rigid" when describing ideological thinking (see her new book: "The Ideological Brain"). It's the thinking that confuses and conflates morality with ideology, with either/or notions about absolute authorities, imperatives, loyalty, purity, & the sacred. Both System 1 and 2 start with intuited belief. Only System 2 will doubt, question, analyze and reflect whether the evidence suggests the intuition be maintained, revised, or replaced. System 1 will justify the belief, no matter the evidence, and so will not be a shortcut to System 2.
Please show how this is flawed. Please question my thinking. The way ethical theories are characterized by thinking style has long been a personal research area for me.
I guess when people say a "shortcut to System 2," it doesn't mean it actually leads to a System 2 judgment. Rather, the idea is that the System 1 intuition—without us realizing it—is approximating the same goal or outcome that a System 2 process would aim for.
It's an approximation to a full System 2 deliberation "A shortcut to" was unclear wording on my part.
I find the methods used by metaphysical-ideological thinkers to be in opposition to the methods that characterize scientific avoiders of dogma (freethinkers).
Metaphysical-ideological Truths are universal, necessary, and certain (absolutes, no approximations). This thinking makes morality into a list of duties. It relies on justifications made using deductions from "self-evident" or other unquestionable assumptions (& from authority).
Scientific truths are warranted assertions. They are particular, contingent, situated, and probable approximations. Along with hypothetico deductive reasoning, scientific thinkers will use abductive reasoning. They take responsibility for their moral decisions by continuously questioning and reasoning to better inferences. They understand that knowing is a process that has no aim or end.
I'm being summary here only because a better explication would require a conversation where definitions are agreed upon and contrary opinions focused upon. Know that I wish to improve my understandings.
In case anyone wants further discussion I should say that I don't have good opinions of Jonathan Haidt or Joshua Greene. I do have good opinions of George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, John Tooby, Leor Zmigrod, and of Iain McGilchrist (subtracting his metaphysical notions). I like Erik Asp's false tagging theory of belief formation. I also like John Dewey's and Hugh Lafollette's pragmatic ethics.
I would be interested in one day reading an article where you lay down your thoughts in full, with all relevant definitions. Seems interesting and there could be much I could learn.
Thanks for asking! I've put many of my thoughts about morality and styles of thinking into answers on my Quora page (Alan Grinnell Jones). I use the site to set down my notions of what's what. It's nice to be able to go thru and revise them. I have only 119 "answers" that you might skim to read my thinking on topics of interest. I'd be very happy to improve my notions with your help.
Regarding ethics, the excerpt from Hugh Lafollette is what I'd give as my current stance. Again, I'd be very happy to have your comments and suggestions. https://qr.ae/pGBxQO
Greene’s deeper problem is one that’s all too common. He thinks he’s discovered a problem with morality (or normativity) in particular. But he’s really discovered a general problem with reason. “We have a strong emotional reaction, and then we invent a principle to match it,” you write. But you could just as easily say: we have strong perceptual reactions, and then we invent theories to match them. His view depends on a clear distinction between intuition and perception, which is exactly what Kant denies.
Since you mentioned it: https://open.substack.com/pub/somefootnotes/p/humanity-marches-forward-on-the-shoulders?utm_source=share&utm_medium=android&r=h46i
Kant’s ideas about masturbation are pretty normal going back through Christian tradition to Platonic philosophy.
The idea is, if we simply allow our base desires to decide our actions, they will lead us into overindulgence, sloth, and immoral behavior. Only by mastering our desires, and not letting them master us, can we possibly act morally, so even in circumstances where it would be more pleasurable to allow our “animal instincts” to guide our decisions, without any apparent moral cost, we should still subordinate those desires to our rational instinct. Habits in one area of life are likely to reflect in other areas, so a man who pleasures himself for no other reason than its pleasurable will be in a very weak position to choose the moral, rather than pleasurable act later on.
My reading of Kant is that he is well aware of incompleteness of deontological system. In short, if the system is logicaly incomplete, but seems to be working, as the humanity is improving and progressing, this is God's design for all intents and purposes. Of course if you take God out of the picture the system gets shaky. If you squint a bit, this debate is just idealism vs materialism.